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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KAREN ADAMS and STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

)
)
Case No. 890690-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellant
vs.

]
i
]

HOWARD H. ADAMS,

Priority No. 14(b)

Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal by
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp.
1989) .

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from a District Court order in a domestic
relations case.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Can the parties to a divorce decree, by their mere

agreement filed with the court clerk's office, modify the child
support obligations ordered by the court in the divorce decree?
2.

If the Department of Social Services (the

"Department") was not a party to such an agreement, and the wife
later begins receiving public assistance on behalf of the
children, does the agreement (regardless of when it was made)

legally prevent the Department from collecting child support from
the husband in accordance with the terms of the divorce decree?
3.

Should the "in-kind" child support agreement

between the defendant/respondent Howard Adams ("Mr. Adams") and
the plaintiff Karen Adams ("Mrs. Adams") be "deemed" a court
order modifying their child support obligation?
4.

If the district court's ruling was that a

modification should be granted which relates back to the date the
"in-kind" child support agreement was filed, did the court err by
allowing an impermissible retroactive modification of a child
support order and by failing to properly consider the interests
of the Department?
5.

If the district court's ruling was to modify Mr.

Adams' child support obligation as of the date of the trial, and
to declare his child support current as of that date, did the
court err in crediting "in-kind" child support against his
previously ordered child support obligation of $200.00 per month?
6.

Regardless of what the basis was for the district

court's decision to allow a modification of Mr. Adams' child
support obligation, did it err in not permitting counsel for the
Department to present relevant authorities to the court on a
i

central issue?
7.

Did the District Court commit reversible error in

finding that the Department acted unreasonably and in bad faith
in this action, and that the Department should therefore pay
attorney's fees to Mr. Adams?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

The following statutes are determinative in this case:
Utah Code Ann, §30-3-10-6(1) and (2) (Supp. 1989).
(1) Each payment or installment of child or
spousal support under any child support orderf
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-401(3), isr on
and after the date it is due:
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and
effect of any judgment of a district court,
except as provided in Subsection (2);
(b) entitled, as a judgmentf to full faith
and credit in this and in any other jurisdiction;
and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification
by this or any other jurisdictionf except as
provided in Subsection (2).
(2) A child or spousal support payment under
a child support order may be modified with
respect to any period during which a petition
for modification is pending, but only from the
date notice of that petition was given to the
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or
to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner.
Utah Code Ann. S62A-11-307.2, Subparagraphs (l)(d) and (2)
(1953), as amended.
(1) An obligee whose rights to support have been
assigned under Section 62A-9-121 as a condition
of eligibility for public assistance has the
following duties:
(d) The obligee may not enter into any agreement
with an obligor that relieves him of any duty or
responsibility of support or purports to settle
past, present or future obligations either as
settlement or prepayment without the office's
written consent.
(2) The office's right to recover is not reduced
or terminated by an agreement entered into in
violation of Subsection (l)(d), whether that
agreement is entered into either before or after
public assistance is furnished on behalf of a
dependent child.
The following rules are determinative in this case:

Rule 14, Rules of Practice of the Second Judicial District,
first sentence (found in Utah Court Rules Annotated, 1988f at
page 615)•
Commencing April 1, 1987, proceedings to modify
an existing Decree of Divorce in the Second
Judicial District shall be commenced by the
filing of a Petition to Modify in the original
divorce action.
Rule 6-404, Code of Judicial Administration (1988), first
sentence.
Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify
in the original divorce action.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding began when Mr. Adams obtained the issuance
of an order to show cause and served it upon the Department.
25-30).

(R.

Through this order to show cause, Mr. Adams sought (1)

court approval of an agreement regarding child support which he
and Mrs. Adams had previously signed and filed with the clerk's
office, (2) a determination that he owed no child support
arrearages, (3) an order holding the Department to the terms of
that agreement and preventing the Department from collecting
child support from him, and (4) an award of attorney's fees
against the Department.

(R. 25-27).

The matter was first heard before the commissioner, who
caused the Department to be made a party plaintiff and
recommended that the relief requested by Mr. Adams essentially be
granted.

(R. 40, 79-81; Transcript of Proceedings before

Commissioner Richards, page 11, lines 18-20).

The Department objected to the commissioner's recommendation
(R. 41-42), and the matter was heard before the district judge on
two separate dates, August 8, 1989 and September 14, 1989.

The

district judge sustained the recommendation of the commissioner
and awarded an increased amount of attorney's fees to Mr. Adams.
(R. 76-77, 79-81, and 82-85).
This appeal followed.

(R. 86-87).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Howard Adams and Karen Adams were married in 1975

and had two children as issue of their marriage.

(R. 9-10).

They were divorced in 1979 by virtue of a Decree of Divorce in
the District Court of Davis County, Utah.

(R. 13-15).

Karen

Adams was the plaintiff in that divorce proceeding, and Howard
Adams was the defendant.
2.

The decree of divorce awarded custody of the

children to Mrs. Adams, and ordered Mr. Adams to pay $100.00 per
month per child as child support.
3.

(R. 13-14).

Some time before July 15, 1988, Mrs. Adams and the

children began living in a home owned by Mr. Adams.

(R. 23). On

July 15, 1988, the two of them signed an agreement (the "in-kind"
child support agreement) in which Mrs. Adams agreed to excuse Mr.
Adams from making cash payments of child support during time
periods that she was occupying the home rent-free.

(R. 23-24).

On July 27, 1988, they filed that agreement with the clerk of the
court in Davis County, Utah, and it was placed in their divorce
file folder.

(R. 23-24).

The Department was not a party to that

agreement.

(R. 23-24).

A copy of the agreement is located in

the addendum of this brief.
4.

The "in-kind" child support agreement was neither

approved by the court nor reduced to a formal court order.

(R.

83; Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 44, line 19
through page 45, line 1).
5.

The "in-kind" child support agreement was prepared

by an attorney who formerly represented Mr. Adams.

(Transcript

of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 10-13; page 44,
lines 13-18; R. 22).
6.

Mr. Adams received the advice of that attorney

regarding the procedure to follow in modifying his child support
obligation.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 44,

lines 19-22) .
7.

At the time the "in-kind" child support agreement

was filed, Mr. Adams knew that by merely filing that agreement
with the clerk's office, he had not obtained a formal
modification of his child support obligation.

(Transcript of

Trial, September 14, 1989, page 41, lines 12-15; page 44, line 23
through page 45, line 1).
8.

The attorney who prepared the agreement advised

Mr. Adams that "down the road it might be better" if Mr. Adams
would petition the court to modify the decree.

(Transcript of

Trial, September 14, 1989, page 44, lines 19-22).
9.

In March 1989, Mrs. Adams applied for public

assistance with the Department.

(R. 83). The district court

found that she provided a copy of the "in-kind" child support

agreement to the welfare office, and that the Department is
charged with knowledge of its existence from that point forward.
(R. 83, 85)
10.

The Department then took steps to collect cash

child support from Howard Adams as provided in the divorce
decree.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 11, lines

13-16).

Mr. Adams protested this action, claiming that his "in-

kind" child support agreement with Mrs. Adams excused him from
paying cash child support.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14,

1989, page 40, lines 5-13).

The Department's position was that

the agreement signed by Mr. and Mrs. Adams was not binding on the
Department and that the Department was obliged to enforce the
child support provisions of the original divorce decree until
they were formally modified.

The Department was therefore

unwilling to discontinue its efforts to collect cash support from
Mr. Adams.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40,

lines 14-23).
11.

Mr. Adams then obtained the issuance of an order

to show cause against the Department, through its Office of
Recovery Services, seeking relief which is described in the
Statement of the Case above.
12.

(R. 25-30).

Thereafter, proceedings were held before the

commissioner, and then the district judge, as is described in the
Statement of the Case above.
13.

Sometime between August 8, 1989 and September 14,

1989, and before these proceedings were concluded before the
district court, the Department sent a notice to Mr. Adams

advising him that the Department would intercept $800.00 from his
next tax refund, and apply it to child support arrearages.

When

he received the notice, Mr. Adams called the Department's
investigator assigned to his case.

The investigator told him

that until the proceedings were concluded, his hands were tied.
At the trial, the investigator was unable to explain why he felt
he could not do anything about the situation until after the
proceedings were concluded.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14,

1989, page 28, line 13 through page 30, line 1; page 42, lines
13-24) .
14.

In the course of the proceedings before the

district court on September 14, 1989, the court repeatedly
suggested that the Department should have simply reduced the
amount of Mrs. Adams' AFDC grant by the amount of the rental
value of the home, instead of trying to collect cash child
support from Howard Adams.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14,

1989, page 61, line 18 through 62, line 2; page 62, line 23; page
69, lines 21-24; page 71, line 20 through page 72, line 1).
Counsel for the Department advised the court that the law does
not allow the value of "in kind" child support to be subtracted
from the amount of the monthly grant an AFDC recipient receives.
He offered to provide the Court with copies of legal authorities
to that effect.

The Court declined the offer and ruled from the

bench without allowing the Department's attorney to present any
authorities on that point.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14,

1989, page 63, line 20 through page 64, line 6).

15.

The district court's written conclusions of law

say that "it seems like a simple matter to apply any rent credit
received as an offset on [Mrs. Adams'] grant. . . . "

The Court

indicated that the Department's failure to do so was
unreasonable.

This finding of unreasonableness was part of the

basis for the Court's award of attorney's fees against the
Department.

(R. 84-85).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Mr. and Mrs. Adams were divorced in 1979, and he was ordered
to pay $200.00 per month for the support of the children.

Later,

in 1988, Mr. and Mrs. Adams made an agreement between themselves
which provided that Mr. Adams could be relieved of his courtordered cash child support obligation as long as he would allow
Mrs. Adams and the children to reside rent-free in a home he
owned.

The "in-kind" child support agreement was prepared by an

attorney who formerly represented Mr. Adams.

Mr. Adams filed the

agreement with the clerk's office.
At that time, Mr. Adams was advised by his attorney that the
"in-kind" child support agreement did not modify his child
support obligation as ordered in the divorce decree.

The

attorney advised Mr. Adams that "down the road it might be
better" if he would go through the steps of petitioning the court
to modify the decree.

(As the ensuing events have shown, those

words were prophetic.)
Even though Mr. Adams knew that by filing the "in-kind"
child support agreement, he had not obtained a modification of

his child support obligation as ordered by the court, he chose
not to petition the court to modify the divorce decree.
Later, Mrs. Adams applied for and began receiving AFDC from
the Department of Social Services.

In accordance with standard

procedure, the Department reviewed the divorce decree,
ascertained Mr. Adams' court-ordered support obligation, and took
steps to begin income withholding as a means of collecting it.
Mr. Adams commenced order to show cause proceedings to stop the
Department from collecting child support from him, and to bind
the Department to the terms of his agreement with Mrs. Adams.
The district court found that the Department had been
provided a copy of the "in-kind" child support agreement, and was
chargeable with knowledge of that agreement.

It found that the

Department should be bound by the terms of the agreement.

It

concluded that the Department was in "bad faith from beginning to
end" and must pay Mr. Adams' attorney's fees.

The ruling of the

district court was clearly erroneous and should be reversed, for
these reasons:
Mr. and Mrs. Adams had no power to bind the court or any
third party to the terms of their agreement.

Their agreement had

no legal effect on Mr. Adams' court-ordered child support
obligation.
The agreement purports to relieve Mr. Adams of his child
support as ordered in the divorce decree, and prejudices the
rights of the Department to collect child support as a means of
recouping the public assistance provided to the children.

The

court found that the Department should be charged with knowledge

of the agreement from the outset of its collection efforts, and
this played a significant role in the court's decision.

Utah

lawf however, provides that such agreements may not reduce or
terminate the Department's right to collect supportf unless the
Department has consented to them, so it is irrelevant whether or
not the Department knew of the agreement.
The effect of the court's ruling was to modify the decree to
conform to the "in-kind" child support agreement, without
properly considering the statutory interests of the Department to
recover public assistance provided.

It was an impermissible

retroactive modification of the decree and improperly credited
"in-kind" child support against Mr. Adams' cash child support
obligation.
The district court seemed to think that the Department
should simply reduce Mrs. Adams welfare grant by the value of the
"in-kind" support she was receiving.

When the Department's

attorney explained that such a procedure is not legally
permissible, and offered to submit authorities to that effect,
the district court would not hear him.
The district court's ruling that the Department has acted in
bad faith is unsupported by the facts, and is clearly erroneous
both in law and fact.

The judgment for attorney's fees against

the Department also appears to have been improperly motivated by
preconceptions the court expressed regarding the Department.
The judgment and order of the district court should be
reversed.

ARGUMENT

I.

Only the court can modify a divorce decree, and it must

do so by means of a court order; until an order modifying the
divorce decree is entered by the court, the original terms of the
divorce decree remain operative regardless of any separate
agreement between the parties.
The Utah divorce statute provides that "the court has
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders
for . . . the custody of the children and their support. . . ."
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) (1953), as amended.

This power to

modify child support orders is given only to the court.
not given to the parties.

It is

It is not given to their attorneys.

Even an administrative law judge may not modify an existing court
order for child support.

Karren v. State Department of Social

Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986); Starks v. State Department of
Social Services, 750 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1988).

As the Supreme

Court stated in the Karren case at page 813, "The power to modify
a [child support] decree is retained by the courts under section
30-3-5." (Emphasis added.)
Unless the court modifies a support order, based upon a
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties, the
original support order remains binding and effective.

Any

attempt to change a court-ordered child support obligation by
some means other than a court-ordered modification is void and
the courts cannot properly enforce it.

Karren v. State

Department of Social Services, supra; Starks v. State Department
of Social Services, supra.

The procedure for seeking a court order modifying the
provisions of a divorce decree is spelled out in Rule 6-404 of
the Code of Judicial Administration.

That rule provides that

proceedings to modify a divorce decree "shall be commenced by the
filing of a petition to modify in the original divorce action."
(In July 1988, when Mr. and Mrs. Adams filed their agreement with
the clerk's office in Davis County, the Code of Judicial
Administration was not yet in effect.

But Rule 14 of the Rules

of Practice of the Second Judicial District, which was in effect
at that time, also provided that proceedings to modify a divorce
decree "shall be commenced by the filing of a Petition to Modify
in the original divorce action."

Utah Court Rules Annotated,

1988, at page 615.)
The parties to a divorce proceeding can, of course,
stipulate to the modification of a child support obligation.

As

the foregoing authorities clearly show, however, they must
petition the court to approve their stipulation and to enter a
formal order modifying the terms of the original child support
order.

The parties themselves do not have the power to bind the

court by their private stipulation between themselves.
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, at 476 (Utah 1975)

Klein v.

Until an order of

modification is entered, the terms of the original child support
order stand unchanged.

As the Utah Supreme Court has stated,

Future child support effectively cannot be
the subject of bargain and sale. Among
other things, the State is an interested
party in such matters since a child's
welfare is at stake, and any modification
of a child support award must be approved
by the court. Price v. Price, 4 Utah 2d
153, 289 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1955).

II.

A mere agreement between the parents of children for

whom public assistance is being provided, which purports to
relieve the non-custodial parent of a court-ordered child support
obligation, is ineffective against the right of the Department to
collect the court-ordered child support from that parent,
regardless of whether that agreement is entered into before or
after such public assistance commences.
The foregoing discussion about the inability of the parties
to a divorce proceeding to bind the court and third parties by
merely entering into an agreement and filing it with the clerk's
office takes on an added dimension when the third party sought to
be bound is the Department.

This is because when the Department

expends taxpayer funds through the AFDC program to support needy
children, the Department has an independent right to recover
those funds from non-custodial parents having the obligation to
support those children.

As the Legislature has stated,

It is declared to be the public policy of
this state that [the Public Support of Children
Act] be liberally construed and administered
to the end that children shall be maintained
from the resources of responsible parents,
thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in
part, the burden often borne by the general
citizenry through public assistance programs.
Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-302 (1953), as amended.
The Department's independent right to recover support is
based in part upon the assignment of support rights which is made
to the Department when a custodial parent applies for AFDC.
Code Ann. §62A-9-121 (1953), as amended.

Utah

This right is also

based on the statutory status of the Department as a real party

in interest, entitled to pursue judicial proceedings to
"establish, modify, and enforce a court order in the name of the
state, any department of the state, the [Office of Recovery
Services], or an obligee to collect support.
§62A-11-106 (1953), as amended.

Utah Code Ann.

See also Utah Code Ann. §78-45-

9(1) (Supp. 1989).
The Department's right to recover support from a noncustodial parent whose children are receiving public assistance
may not be prejudiced or compromised by the custodial parent.
Among other things, the law provides as follows with respect to
obligees whose children are receiving public assistance:
(l)(d) The obligee may not enter into any
agreement with an obligor that relieves
him of any duty or responsibility of
support or purports to settle past, present,
or future obligations either as settlement
or prepayment without the office's written
consent.
(2) The office's right to recover is not
reduced or terminated by an agreement entered
into in violation of Subsection (l)(d),
whether that agreement is entered into either
before or after public assistance is furnished
on behalf of a dependent child. Utah Code Ann.
§62A-ll-307.2 (1953), as amended. (Emphasis
added).
The above language from Section 62A-11-307.2 became law on April
24, 1989.

It replaced and clarified an earlier enactment,

namely, Utah Code Ann. §62A-ll-304(4), which read as follows:
No agreement between any obligee and any
obligor that relieves an obligor of any
duty or responsibility of support, or
purports to settle past, present or future
support obligations, either as settlement
or prepayment, reduces or terminates the
rights of the office to recover from that
obligor for support provided, unless the

office has consented to the agreement in
writing. (Emphasis added).
Section 62A-ll-304(4) became effective on January 19f 1988.
Prior to that date, a virtually identical provision was found at
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(4) (1953), as amended.
It is clear that since before 1988 (when the agreement
between Mr. and Mrs. Adams was signed and filed with the clerk's
office), Utah statute law has protected the Department from
attempts by parents to defeat the Department's right to recover
public assistance.

Each revision to the statute has clarified

the intent of the Legislature to insulate the Department from the
effect of child support compromise and settlement agreements to
which it did not give its written consent.
The Department submits that the current Section 62A-11307(2), which clarifies that such agreements have no effect on
the Department's right of recovery, regardless of whether those
agreements are entered into either before or after public
assistance is furnished, governs the disposition of this case
even though Mr. and Mrs. Adams' agreement was filed prior to the
effective date of the statute.

This is because Section 62A-11-

?o7 ZCZ)

307.2 Is merely a clarification by the Legislature of that which
was implicit in the earlier statute, and the newer enactment
should govern.

Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242

(Utah App. 1989)
Even if this court were to determine, however, that the
former statute should govern, the result should be no different.
This is because Section 62A-ll-304(4) provided that "no
agreement" between any obligor and obligee to settle child

support obligations can affect the office's right to recover
support.

There is no requirement that the agreement must have

been entered into after public assistance was furnished; to the
contrary, the words "no agreement" permit no such limitation
regarding the date of the agreement.
One important feature of the statutes cited above is that
they provide that the Department is not bound by such an
agreement between the parties unless it has consented to the
agreement in writing.

Whether or not the Department is aware of

the agreement is wholly irrelevant.

Indeed, it would be unjust

to bind the Department to agreements between husbands and wives
which prejudice its rights, simply because it has become aware of
them.

In holding that the Department was bound by the terms of

the "in-kind" child support agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams,
the district court was strongly influenced by the fact that the
Department was aware of the existence of this agreement.
85).

(R. 79-

The district court departed from the statute in so doing

and committed reversible error.
It should be noted that if the husband and wife in a divorce
case enter into an agreement which is not approved and ordered by
the court, but which purports to modify court ordered rights and
obligations between them, and one of them relies on that
agreement to his detriment, an issue might arise regarding
whether the other spouse should be estopped from enforcing the
terms of the court order.

That is not an issue in this case,

because the husband is not trying to bind the wife to their
agreement, but is instead trying to bind the Department, which
was a stranger to their agreement.

That issue goes beyond the scope of this brief, and the
Department takes no position on that subject.

The Department

simply notes that regardless of whether Mr. and Mrs. Adams might
have a basis for holding each other to the terms of their
agreement, the foregoing authorities show that (1) their mere
agreement does not change the terms of the divorce decree, (2)
third parties are entitled to rely on the efficacy of the divorce
decree, and the (3) Department's right to recover support is not
reduced or terminated by the agreement.
The discussion in this section of the brief is limited, of
course, to situations where the husband and wife have made such
an agreement, and no court order has ever been entered adopting
the agreement.

The Department acknowledges tnat if the court

enters an order adopting the terms of such an agreement, the
Department is bound by the terms of that order.

The Department

may have the right to ask the court to set aside the order, or it
may appeal the order, but once the order is entered, and until
such time as the order is set aside, reversed, or modified, it
constitutes the order of the court and must be followed by the
Department.

III. The "in-kind" child support agreement was not the
equivalent of a court order modifying Mr. Adams' child support
obligation, and the Department was entitled to collect child
support pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree.
In this case, the district court's judgment and order
expressly sustains the domestic relations commissioner's

determination that the "in-kind" child support agreement between
Mr. and Mrs. Adams "was sufficient to be deemed as if an Order
had been drafted by the Court."

(R. 77, 80). (Emphasis added.)

The findings of fact signed by the judge also say that the
parties "entered into a Stipulation and Agreement amending the
Decree. . . . " (Emphasis added.) (R. 83). These rulings by the
court appears to ratify the agreement as being an actual court
order.
The district court, however, stated elsewhere in its
findings of fact that although the agreement was filed by Mr.
Adams with the desire to amend the divorce decree, the decree
"was not however formally modified."

(R. 83). And in its oral

ruling following the trial on September 14, 1989, the court
seemed to indicate that it was modifying the divorce decree that
day, and allowing the modification to relate back to the date of
the agreement so as to give Mr. Adams full credit for all in-kind
child support he had paid to date, leaving him current in his
child support obligation as of the date of the trial.
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68, lines 4-14).
It is also possible to interpret the district court's ruling
as a modification of the decree as of the date of the trial,
accompanied by a determination that Mr. Adams' "in-kind" payments
up to that point would be applied to give him full credit against
his original child support obligation of $200.00 per month.
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68, lines 4-14).
Whichever reasoning was adopted by the district court, it
committed reversible error.

The remainder of this section of the

brief will show why the court erred if its ruling was a
ratification that the "in-kind" child support agreement is deemed
a court order modifying the divorce decree.

The next two

sections of the brief will cover those other lines of reasoning
which it appears the court may have used.
If the district court's ruling was to ratify the "in-kind"
child support agreement as a court order modifying Mr. Adams'
child support obligation, then it erred, because the agreement of
the parties plainly did not constitute a court order and is not
entitled to be treated as such.
First, based on the authorities set forth in the preceding
sections, a mere agreement between the parties to a divorce is
not entitled to be treated as a court order, and the "in-kind"
child support agreement, to which the Department never consented,
could have no effect on the Department's right to collect $200.00
per month in ongoing child support from Mr. Adams as originally
ordered by Judge Thornley K. Swan in the divorce decree.
Second, the procedure for seeking a court order was not
followed.

Rule 7(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that "[a]n application to the court for an order shall
be by motion. . . . "

The Code of Judicial Administration, and

the predecessor local rules, supra, specifically provide that a
party seeking an order modifying a divorce decree must file a
petition to modify.

No motion or petition to modify was filed by

either Mr. or Mrs. Adams seeking court approval of their
agreement.

Their agreement itself does not contain any language

that could even be construed as a request for court approval.

Third, the "in-kind" child support agreement contains no
manifestation of judicial action.

Rule 7(b)(2) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure defines "Order" as follows: "An order includes
every direction of the court including a minute order made and
entered in writing." (Emphasis added.) An "order" of a court is
a decision made by the court settling a question in a case.

56

AmJur 2d 4, Orders §3. The Adams agreement has none of the
characteristics of a court order.

It purports to a contractual

agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, and nothing more.

For

example, its provision allowing either Mr. or Mrs. Adams to
cancel the agreement without cause, by simply giving thirty days
notice to the other, is very common in a typical contract, but is
not characteristic of a court order.

The district court's ruling

that the Adams agreement should be treated as a court order
stretches the definition of "court order" beyond the breaking
point.
Fourth, the "in-kind" child support agreement was not signed
by the judge.

If it really was an order modifying the divorce

decree, then it would have been an appealable order.
would be a "judgment" under Utah law.
Civil Procedure.

Rule 54(a), Utah Rules of

Under Utah law, " . . . all judgments shall be

signed by the judge."
Procedure.

As such, it

Rule 58A(b), Utah Rules of Civil

(Emphasis added.)

In the case of Wisden v. City of

Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held
that an unsigned minute entry does not constitute a judgment,
because it is not signed by the judge.

In that case, at least,

there was a minute entry indicating some manifestation of

judicial action, and even that was not enough without the judge's
signature.

In this case, not only is there no signature of the

judge on the agreement, but there is no manifestation whatever of
judicial action.

The agreement should therefore have not been

treated as an order modifying the divorce decree.
Fifth, Mr. Adams cannot argue that he was acting as his own
attorney when the agreement was prepared and filed, and that he
should be held to a lesser standard of compliance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Even if such an argument that pro se

litigants should be held to a lesser standard were valid, it
would not apply in this case because the undisputed facts of this
case show that the agreement was prepared by Mr. Adams' former
attorney, that Mr. Adams received the advice of that attorney
regarding the procedure to follow in modifying his child support
obligation, that at the time the agreement was filed, Mr. Adams
knew that by merely filing that agreement with the clerk's
office, he had not obtained a formal modification of his child
support obligation, and that the attorney who prepared the
agreement advised Mr. Adams that it would be "better" if Mr.
Adams would petition the court to modify the decree.

(Transcript

of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 10-13; page 41,
lines 12-15; page 44, line 13 through page 45, line 1.)
Finally, the district court, in giving effect to the "in
kind" child support agreement, virtually ignored the interests of
the Department and the taxpaying citizenry of Utah who were
providing support for the children of Mr. and Mrs. Adams.

"In-

kind" child support arrangements are detrimental to the interests

of the Department because even though it is providing a monthly
welfare check to the custodial parent, it is unable to recoup any
of its public assistance costs from the father, who is satisfying
his support obligation by making in-kind payments to the
custodial parent.

This gives the custodial parent a double

benefit and leaves the Department without a remedy.
When counsel for the Department tried to get the court to
take these interests into consideration, the district court made
short shrift of his arguments.

The following interchange took

place when counsel for the Department tried to explain that the
State has an interest in opposing in-kind child support
arrangements involving public assistance recipients.
MR. PERRY:

. . . [T]he State has an interest.

THE COURT:
What's the interest of the State that
would stop it?
MR. PERRY:
The interest of the State is that
they're now providing public assistance for those
minor children.
THE COURT:

So what?

(R. 60, lines 9-15)
To justify its determination to allow in-kind child support
in this case, the court concluded that the Department should
protect its interests by reducing the public assistance grants of
custodial parents who receive in-kind child support. When
counsel for the Department told the court that the law does not
allow such a procedure, and offered to introduce legal
authorities to that effect, the court would not hear him.
issue is covered in Point Six below.

That

Apart from the interests of the Departmentf such "in-kind"
arrangements, in which a dwelling is provided in lieu of cash
child support, are viewed with a certain degree of skepticism by
the courts.

This is because it may be in the best interests of

the children to require cash support for them, instead of
providing a particular dwelling for them.

Also, when the obligor

is the owner of the home being provided for the children (as in
this case), such arrangements must be carefully scrutinized by
the court.

In the case of DeBry v. DeBry, a wife had stipulated

to such an arrangement with her husband, and it was made part of
the original divorce decree.

Later, the wife petitioned the

trial court to set aside her stipulation because it resulted in
an unfair situation.

The trial court denied her request.

On

appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court, and
stated as follows:
. . . [I]n following the stipulation the
court may have abused his discretion, for
in awarding the mortgaged home to the husband
he permitted his equity therein to be augmented
with money which should have been made available
for the support of the children. No provision
is made for the husband to make any contribution
to the support of the children except to furnish a
roof over their heads. By the decree the husband
increases his own wealth each time he makes a
mortgage payment in lieu of support payment.
Where little children are involved, the
court is not obligated to adopt or follow a
stipulation of the parties which would not
adequately provide for the care and welfare
of the children. In a divorce suit the primary
concern of the court is the welfare of the minor
children, and the court should carefully
scrutinize any agreement between the parties
which might tend to affect adversely that welfare.
27 Utah 2d 337, 496 P.2d 92 (Utah 1972)

The record does not disclose whether the home provided by Mr.
Adams is subject to a mortgage.
difference.

But it should make no

When a home is owned by an obligor free and clear of

any mortgage, the unfairness of the situation still exists
because aside from paying property taxes and the cost of major
repairs to the premises, he is not having to actually pay any
money and is still receiving a full credit for paying child
support.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, then, the Department
respectfully submits that the district court erred in ratifying
the "in-kind" child support agreement signed by Mr. and Mrs.
Adams as a court order and in ruling that the Department was
barred by said agreement from enforcing the child support
provisions of the divorce decree signed by Judge Swan.

IV.

If the district court's decision was to grant a

modification at trial, relating it back to the date the Adams
agreement was filed, the court committed reversible error by
allowing an impermissible retroactive modification of a child
support order, and by failing to properly consider the interests
of the Department.
Instead of giving "order" effect to the agreement of Mr. and
Mrs. Adams, it is possible that the district court intended to
grant, on the date of the trial, a modification of Mr. Adams'
child support obligation which related back to the date the
agreement was filed with the court.

This would be clear error.

First, retroactive modifications of child support orders are
not allowed in Utah.

Utah Code Ann. 30-3-10.6 (Supp. 1989);

Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975).

They may relate back

to the date a petition to modify is filed, but there was no
petition to modify the child support order in this case.
Code Ann. 30-3-10.6 (Supp. 1989).

Utah

It would be incorrect to

construe the "in-kind" child support agreement as a petition to
modify the decree because the agreement purports to be nothing
more than a contract between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, cancellable on
30-days notice, and it contains no language requesting court
approval.

This conclusion is bolstered by Mr. Adams' own

testimony at trial that at the time he filed the agreement, he
knew it would not modify the child support order unless he also
petitioned the court for a modification.

(Transcript of Trial,

September 14, 1989, page 44, line 19 through page 45, line 1).
Second, the district court failed to properly take into
account the Department's interests, discussed extensively in the
preceding sections, in receiving reimbursement of public
assistance.
(It should also be noted that Utah law provides a rebuttable
presumption that the amount of child support specified for a
particular case under the child support guidelines is the correct
amount of child support.

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2(2).

If the

court feels that it would be "unjust, inappropriate, or not in
the best interest of a child" to apply the guidelines in a
particular case to use the guidelines in a case, then it must
make a specific finding to that effect.

No such finding exists

in this case, yet the district court clearly departed from the
child support guidelines.)

V.

When a child support obligor is required by specific

court order to pay a specific dollar amount of child support, he
may not satisfy that obligation by providing a dwelling for the
children to live in, particularly when the children are receiving
public assistance and the party entitled to receive that child
support is the Department of Social Services.
The record also can be read to indicate that instead of
relating the modification back to the date the agreement was
filed, the court made the modification fully effective at the
date of trial, and credited Mr. Adams' in-kind payments up to
that point against his original $200.00 per month child support
obligation.
lines 4-14).

(Transcript of Trial, September 14f 1989, page 68,
If the court so ruled, it committed reversible

error.
Child support obligations must be paid according to the
terms of the underlying decree of divorce.

A party who believes

a change of circumstances justifies a change in the decree must
petition the court for modification of the decree, rather than
resorting to "self-help."

This principle makes good sense,

because otherwise, no one could rely on the efficacy of divorce
decrees.

Our system of family law would be undermined by parties

who attempted to change their court-ordered rights and
obligations without formally modifying those rights and
obligations on the record.

In the case of Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d

600 (Utah 1979), the husband sought to credit "in-kind" child
support payments against his cash child support obligation.

The

Supreme Court held that he was ". . . not entitled, however to
credit for expenditures made on behalf of the children or [the
wife] which do not specifically conform to the terms of the
decree."

592 P.2d 500, at 603.

(The court went on to say that

if the wife were to consent to such an arrangement, then he could
hold her to her agreement.

But there is no authority to bind

third parties, such as the Department, to such an agreement
between the husband and wife.)
Utah law further bolsters this principle by providing that
if child support installments are not paid on time they become
final, unalterable judgments against the obligor.

Retroactive

modification of a child support order is not permissible, except
that a modification order may relate back to the date notice of a
petition for modification is given to the opposing party.
Code Ann. §30-3-10.6 (Supp. 1989).

Utah

See also Seeley v. Park,

supra.
For these reasons, it was improper for the district court to
give Mr. Adams retroactive credit against his $200.00 per month
child support obligation, simply because he had provided his
children with a dwelling whose rental value exceeded $200.00 per
month.

Allowing Mr. Adams to receive child support credit

because he provided the dwelling did not comply with the terms of
the child support order which was in effect at the time.

Giving

the retroactive credit for in-kind support is no different in its
effect from retroactively modifying the decree, which also should

not have happened in this case for the reasons discussed in the
preceding section.
Giving retroactive credit for in-kind support becomes even
more problematical when the children are receiving public
assistance, and the support is owed to the Department.

As is

discussed above, such "in-kind" arrangements totally ignore the
interests of the Department.

They make it impossible for the

Department to obtain reimbursement of public assistance provided
to the children.
Accordingly, it was reversible error if the district court's
judgment and order gave retroactive credit to Mr. Adams for inkind child support paid.

The Department is entitled to collect

child support from Mr. Adams as per the terms of the original
divorce decree, for time periods that public assistance was
provided.

VI.

Regardless of what the basis was for the district

court's decision to allow a modification of Mr. Adams child
support obligation, it erred in not permitting counsel for the
Department to present authorities on a central issue.
In addition to failing to properly consider the interests of
the Department in ruling on the merits of Mr. Adams' request for
a modification, the district court erred in not allowing counsel
for the Department to present authorities showing that public
assistance grants may not be reduced by the value of in-kind
child support received.

This was a reversible error, depriving

the Department of the opportunity to fully present its case to
the court.

Although the presentation of those authorities nowf when the
case is on appeal, is of secondary importance, it is appropriate
to highlight here the legal authorities which prevent the
Department from reducing a welfare grant by the value of in-kind
child support received.
In calculating the amount of welfare grant to which a
recipient is entitled, the Department must determine the income
of the family as defined in the rules and regulations governing
the welfare program.

The Utah Administrative Code lists a

variety of types of income which may not be counted as income in
determining the amount of a welfare grant, and states that
"Unearned income in-kind is excluded."

R. 810-213-303.1(8), Utah

Administrative Code (Revised as of August 25, 1989).

A copy of

this rule is found in the addendum of this brief.
Child support is a form of unearned income.

R. 810-213-

303.1(18)(a), Utah Administrative Code (Revised as of August 25,
1989). (See addendum).

Accordingly, all in-kind child support is

not countable as income in any way for purposes of calculating
the amount of a welfare grant. Accordingly, the Department may
not reduce a welfare grant by the value of in-kind child support
received by the custodial parent.
The rules cited above have been duly adopted pursuant to the
provisions of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act (Utah Code
Ann. §63-46a-l, (1953) as amended, et seq.)
of law.

They have the effect

Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-2(13)(a). Accordingly, if the

Department were to follow the district court's suggestion, and
reduce a custodial parent's welfare grant by the value of in-kind

child support received, the Department would violate Utah law by
so doing.

Even though the arrangement seemed reasonable to the

district court, it still is contrary to the law.
It should also be noted that federal regulations prevent the
State from singling out in-kind child support, treating it as
"countable income," and thereby reducing a welfare grant.

Those

regulations, which have the force of federal law, set out the
general rule that in determining the need and amount of
assistance a recipient is entitled to, a State must take all
types of income into consideration in the same way, unless
otherwise specifically authorized by federal statute.
§233.20(1)(i)

45 CFR

No federal statute authorizes States to treat in-

kind child support differently from other types of unearned inkind income, so the State must treat both of these items in the
same way.

Thus if Utah wanted to count in-kind child support as

countable income, it would also have to count other forms of
unearned in-kind income, such as food, clothing and supplies from
churches and other charitable organizations.

Utah has chosen

not to include any of these items as countable income.
There can be little doubt that a major reason why the
district court felt justified in changing Mr. Adams' child
support obligation to an "in-kind" arrangement was that the court
was confident that the Department could, and should, reduce Mrs.
Adams welfare grant by the rental value of the home being
provided for her and the children.

This is evidenced, for

example, in the conclusions of law, where the court stated as
follows:

4. That is seems like a simple matter to
apply any rent credit received as an offset
on Plaintiff's grant. . • . (R. 84).
The transcript of the trial on September 14, 1989 also contains
numerous statements by the court to the effect that the best
thing for all parties concerned would be to allow the in-kind
child support payments, and reduce Mrs. Adams' welfare grant
accordingly.

Consider, for example, the following interchange

between the court and the Department's attorney:
THE COURT: Knowing that the value of the
property or rental value is more than the
$200 child support, why couldn't the State
have just told their client that they will
reduce the grant by $200?
MR. HUMMEL: Well, because the federal statutes
will not allow the State to do that.
THE COURT:
MR. HUMMEL:

Why not?
Because the statute says—

THE COURT: Is there something unreasonable
about it? (Transcript of Trial, September 14,
1989, page 61, line 18 through page 62, line 2)
See also similar statements by the court on pages 62, 63, 69, and
71

of the Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989.
Principles of fundamental fairness and due process require

that a party be given the opportunity to present legal
authorities to the court which support its position.

This is

particularly important when the issue is one upon which the court
is largely basing its decision.

Normally, ample time is given

the parties at the hearing to present their authorities.

In

appropriate circumstances, it is common for trial courts to give
counsel the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs after trial
to assist in resolving important issues.

Utah statute also requires the courts of this State to
receive the Utah Administrative Code as an authorized compilation
of the law of Utah.
amended.

Utah Code Ann. §63-46a-16 (1953), as

This is another reason why the court should have

allowed the Department's attorney to submit the authorities which
are highlighted above.
In this case, however, the court would not allow counsel for
the Department the opportunity to present authorities in support
of the Department's position on this issue.

The Department

respectfully submits that the district court, by its statements
to counsel for the Department, instead made it clear that the
court had no interest in the Department's statutory and
regulatory authorities on this point.

The interchange quoted

immediately above, in which the court interrupted counsel when
counsel was preparing to explain why grant reduction is not
allowed, is an example of this.

Most notable is the following

interchange between the court and the Department's counsel:
MR. HUMMEL: And I can provide you —
copies of the federal regulations.
THE COURT:

submit

I don't need them.

MR. HUMMEL: That covers that matter if the
Court would like. . . .
THE COURT: If you stacked all the federal
regulations having referred to just child
support and related matters, how high would
the regulations stack?
MR. HUMMEL: I don't know.
THE COURT: I don't either, but several feet.
I know that. . . . (Transcript of Trial,
September 14, 1989, page 63, line 20 through
page 64, line 5)

If the court had given the Department the opportunity to
present its authorities on this pointf the district court might
not have felt that it could rule the way it did.

The Department

respectfully submits that the court's refusal to allow its
counsel to present those authorities was arbitrary and capricious
and constituted reversible error.

VII. The facts and the law of this case demonstrate that the
Department has acted reasonably and in good faith; the district
court's ruling that the Department acted unreasonably and in bad
faith, and that the Department should suffer a judgment for
attorney's fees, is neither legally nor factually supportable,
and was clearly erroneous.
The district court stated that its legal basis for entering
judgment for attorney's fees against the Department was "bad
faith" and "unreasonableness" on the part of the Department.

(R.

85; Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 72, lines 1722).

The Department respectfully submits, however, that there

was no legal or factual basis for requiring it to pay attorney's
fees to Mr. Adams, and that the district court's order to that
effect was clearly erroneous.
The Department has been unable to find any case or statutory
authorities specifically allowing an award of attorney's fees
when the court finds the actions of one of the parties to be in
"bad faith" and "unreasonable."

Section 78-27-56, Utah Code

Annotated (Supp. 1989), however, provides for an award of
attorney's fees in civil actions where an action is filed, or a

defense is raised, without merit and without good faith.

It

appears that the district court relied on this statute in making
the award.

That reads, in pertinent partf as follows:

(1) In civil actions, the court shall
award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith. . . .
This statute provides for an award of attorney's fees to a
prevailing party to a civil action under the following
circumstances;
A.

The losing party brought an action, or asserted a

defense to an action, and
B.

The action, or defense, was without merit.

This has

been defined as "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance
having no basis in law or fact."

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149,

at 151 (Utah 1983) (Emphasis added), and
C.

The action, or defense, was not brought, or asserted,

in good faith.

In Cady v. Johnson, supra, the Utah Supreme Court

approved the following definition of "good faith":
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of
the activities in guestion; (2) no intent
to take unconscionable advantage of others;
and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the
fact that the activities in guestion will
hinder, delay or defraud others.
To establish lack of good faith, one must prove
that one or more of these factors is lacking.
(Cady v.Johnson, at 151.)
With this statutory backdrop, it is now appropriate to
examine the facts which could be relevant to the attorney's fees
issue, and to consider whether they justify the award in this

case (keeping in mind that Mr. Adams, as the moving party, had
the burden of proof).

The following is a summary of the facts

the district court might have found relevant to this issue, if
the district court believed all of the evidence presented by Mr.
Adams, and resolved any disputed testimony in favor of Mr. Adams:
1.

When Mrs. Adams applied for public assistance, she

supplied the Department with a copy of her divorce decree and a
copy of her agreement with Mr. Adams for "in-kind" child support.
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 21, lines 4-12).
2.

The divorce decree required Mr. Adams to pay child

support in the amount of $200.00 per month.
3.

The "in-kind" child support agreement had never been

formally modified.
4.

(R. 13-14).

(R. 83).

The Department believed it was entitled to collect

child support from Mr. Adams in the amount ordered in the divorce
decree and took steps to do so.

It send an advance notice to Mr.

Adams of its intention to withhold income.

(Transcript of

Trial, September 14, 1989, page 11, lines 13-16; page 40, lines
14-23).
5.

Mr. Adams then called the Department and talked with

the investigator working the case about the "in-kind" child
support agreement that he and Mrs. Adams had signed and filed
with the clerk's office.

Presumably, Mr. Adams asked the

investigator to honor the terms of that agreement, and drop
efforts to collect the support ordered in the divorce decree
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 5-13).

6.

The investigator asked Mr. Adams if the agreement had

been reduced to an order.

Mr. Adams said that it had not been

reduced to an order, but was an agreement between himself and his
former wife.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40,

lines 7-10).
7.

The investigator then told Mr. Adams that since the

"in-kind" arrangement had not been ordered by the court, and was
just an agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams, the Department was
not bound by it and would have to proceed to collect child
support from him as ordered in the divorce decree.

(Transcript

of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 40, lines 14-23).
8.

Mr. Adams then retained counsel and served the

Department with the order to show cause.
9.

(R. 27).

The Department ceased all income withholding procedures

against Mr. Adams, but continued to take the position that it was
not bound by the "in-kind" agreement and that it was desirous of
collecting child support as ordered in the divorce decree.
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 14, line 14
through page 15, line 3; page 40, lines 20-23).
10.

On June 29, 1989, a hearing on the order to show cause

was heard before the commissioner, who recommended that Mr. Adams
essentially be granted the relief he had prayed for.
11.

(R. 79-81).

The Department objected to that recommendation and the

matter was heard by the district judge in two separate hearings,
one on August 8, 1989 and the other on September 14, 1989. The
district judge ruled on the matter at the conclusion of the
second hearing, sustaining the commissioner's recommendation and

awarding an increased amount of attorney's fees to Mr. Adams.
(R. 41, 45, 76).
12.

Since the date it ceased the proceedings for income

withholding, the Department has taken no action against Mr.
Adams, with the single exception of the notice of tax intercept
that was sent to Mr. Adams.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14,

1989, page 28, line 13 through page 30, line 1; page 42, lines
13-24).

The Department respectfully submits that the district
court's conclusion that the Department must pay Mr. Adams'
attorney's fees was clearly erroneous, for the following reasons:
The Department's defense to this order to show cause
proceeding is meritorious;

In the context of Utah Code Ann. §78-

27-56, it seems clear that the "civil action" involved is the
order to show cause proceeding initiated by Mr. Adams against the
Department.

As is shown earlier in this brief, the Department's

defense to Mr. Adams' action is meritorious.

When the Department

first became involved in this matter, it was faced with a
situation where there was an existing, unmodified order for
$200.00 per month in child support.

There was a separate

agreement signed by the husband and wife in which they agreed to
an in-kind child support arrangement, but that agreement had
never been approved by the court.

Since the parties to a divorce

clearly cannot modify their decree by a mere agreement between
themselves, the Department was completely justified in seeking to
enforce the existing order of the court.

Counsel for Mr. Adams suggested at the trial that the
Department should have sought to modify, or at least interpret,
the divorce decree before collecting the $200.00 per month child
support.

(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 60,

lines 2-5). Such a suggestion makes no sense, because the
divorce decree was very clear on this point.

Such a suggestion

focuses the responsibility for this whole case in the wrong
place.

If Mr. Adams had simply had his former attorney obtain a

formal modification, then this case would never have arisen.

By

his own testimony, Mr. Adams knew that his divorce decree had not
been modified, and that it would have been better if he had
petitioned the court for a modification.

If any party's position

in this case is without merit, it is Mr. Adams', not the
Department's.
Since the Department's position is meritorious, there is no
basis for awarding attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56.
Even if there were no merit to the Department's position,
the Department has acted in good faith in defending this action.
There is not one shred of evidence that the Department has
asserted any defenses in this proceeding that have not been in
good faith.

Mr. Adams has not produced any evidence showing that

the Department does not honestly believe that is should properly
be allowed to collect child support from him.

He has produced no

evidence of Department intent to take unconscionable advantage of
any person.

He has also produced no evidence of intent to, or

knowledge of, the Department that it is delaying, defrauding, or
hindering any person.

Rather than showing any lack of good faith on the part of
the Department, the evidence shows that the Department honestly
believes in its propriety of its position, that it respects Mr.
Adams' opposing position, and that it endeavored to present its
defenses and arguments to the district court in a dignified and
respectful manner.

It was unjust for the district court to find

the Department had acted in bad faith when the Department was
simply trying to enforce the divorce decree.

The Department

could have had no idea that the district court would subsequently
rule that the Department should have given "court order" effect
to, and considered itself legally bound by, a mere agreement
between Mr. and Mrs. Adams to which it was not a party.

The

district court's finding of bad faith was clearly erroneous.
A few brief comments are necessary regarding the tax
intercept notices sent out by the Department.
generated by computer each year.

These notices are

They are sent to persons who,

according to Department records, owe child support arrearages.
They are sent out automatically, without any conscious act by the
investigator working each case, unless the investigator, before
the notices are mailed out, enters a computer code telling the
computer not to send a notice to a particular person.

If a

person receiving such a notice disputes the claimed child support
arrearage, then he may do so.
spelled out in the notice.

Procedures for so doing are

The Department concedes that in light

of the commissioner's recommendation, it erred in sending the
notice to Mr. Adams, but it submits that such action did not
constitute making a claim, or asserting a defense, in a civil

action.

It was an extrajudicial action completely.

The sending

of that letter could not legally subject the Department to an
award of attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56.

Perhaps if

evidence had been introduced proving that such notice had been
mailed in wilful disobedience of an order of the court (which was
not the case!), the district court might have pursued a contempt
citation against the Department.

Section 78-27-56, however,

would not have been available.
Even if this court were to find that the sending of the
advance notice of tax intercept is the type of action that could
subject the Department to an attorney's fee award under Section
78-27-56, the attorney's fee award in this case would still need
to be reversed because the notice was not sent in bad faith.

The

elements required to prove lack of good faith, as quoted earlier,
necessarily require that the party be conscious that it is doing
the thing which is supposedly is being done with a lack of good
faith.

In this case, however, the notice was mailed

automatically to Mr. Adams through a computer generated process.
The Department acknowledges that it should have entered the
necessary computer code to prevent such a notice from being sent
to Mr. Adams.

The Department's failure to do this, however, was

a negligent oversight.

There was no proof that the ORS

investigator even knew the notice had been sent until Mr. Adams
called him.
The Department respectfully submits that not only was the
district court's decision to award the judgment for attorney's
fees not supported by the relevant facts and law in this case,

but it appears that the court's decision was strongly influenced
by extraneous matters which were not properly before the court,
were not supported by evidence in the case, and should not have
even been taken into consideration.
(1)

For example:

The court referred to the Department as a vast, complex

bureaucracy that has an endless supply of money and unreasonably
pressures people without reason.

(Transcript of Trial, September

14, 1989, page 67, lines 2-11).
(2) The court stated that the Office of Recovery Services
on a national level is strongly influenced by a "women's lib
bias."
(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68, lines 18-20).
(3)

The court stated that the State of Utah is in the

forefront of pushing a national program, sometimes to meet
federal requirements, but sometimes going beyond those
requirements in order to "get the most from the federal
government."

(Transcript of Trial, September 14, 1989, page 68,

line 22 through page 69, line 14.)
(4) The court referred to the Office of Recovery Services
as a blind bureaucracy that can only see its own point of view
and not what's reasonable.
written conclusions of law.

This was one of the court's formal
(R. 84; Transcript of Trial,

September 14, 1989, page 70, lines 2-4)
The Department, of course, vigorously disputes these
apparent preconceived notions of the district court.

It

respectfully submits that in light of these extraneous factors
which obviously influenced the court's decision, the award of

attorney's fees was not only unsupported by the facts and law of
this case, but it was arbitrary and capricious.
The district court's award of attorney's fees is thus not
support by either the facts or the law.

The Department

respectfully submits that the court's ruling on this point is
clearly erroneous and should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Department
respectfully asks this court for the following relief:
1.

For an order reversing the judgment of the district

court in all its aspects, reinstating the child support
provisions of the original divorce decree, and expressly
declaring that the Department is authorized to enforce the child
support provisions thereof as authorized by law.
2.

For an order holding that the "in-kind" child support

agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Adams was nothing more than a
private agreement between them, that it had no effect on the
provisions of their divorce decree, and that the Department is
not and has never been bound by that agreement.
3.

For an order stating that if the any party desires to

modify any provisions of the divorce decree, they shall do so in
accordance with applicable procedural rules, including the rule

requiring the filing and service of a petition to modify.
DATED this 23rd day of February, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

BLAINE R. FERGUSON Q
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I caused four copies of this Brief to be
mailed to each of the following persons at the following
addresses, postage prepaid, this 23rd day of February, 1990:
Scott w. Holt
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent Howard H. Adams
44 North Main
Layton, UT 84041
Karen Adams (Hill)
Plaintiff
977 North 600 West
Orem, UT 84057
Karen Adams (Hill)
Plaintiff
997 North 600 West
Orem, UT 84057

BLAINE R. FERGUSON {J
Assistant Attorney General

A D D E N D U M

EXHIBIT "A"

AGREEMENT BETWEEN MR. AND MRS. ADAMS

EXHIBIT "B"

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

EXHIBIT "C"

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

EXHIBIT "D"

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

EXHIBIT "E"

EXCERPT FROM UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

i Jrri(
r'. UTAH

JW-27 P K M 8
IN THE DISTRICT

COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL

DISTAL

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH:;-'_

:JFU

££.
•u'UJY CLERK

KAREN HATCH A D A M S ,
(L1SOMBEE) ,

A G - R E E M E N

T

Plaintiff,
vs
HOWARD H. A D A M S ,
Defendant.

W H E R E A S , the defendant

is the owner of a home at Number

165 West 2000 North Street, in Layton, Utah, which home is now
being occupied

by the plaintiff as a d w e l l i n g for herself and

her family; and
W H E R E A S , the defendant

is required to pay child support to

the plaintiff m o n t h l y ; and
W H E R E A S , the reasonable monthly rental value of the said
is now in e x c e s s of the amount of child support

home

required.

NOW, T H E R E F O R E , it is hereby m u t u a l l y ageeed as f o l l o w s :
1.

That tne plaintiff may c o n t i n u e to so occupy

and will accept

said h o m e ,

such rental value instead of receiving a cash

payment of child support each month the home is being so o c c u p i e d ,
and that the p l a i n t i f f does hereby e x c u s e the d e f e n d a n t

from

making cash payments of child support during such t i m e .

flVJtfB

2.

That this agreement may be terminated by either party

upon thirty (30) days notice to the other party, and that upon
such termination, the plaintiff will surrender the possession
of the home to the defendant, and the defendant will then

resume

payment of cash child support payments, to the plaintiff.
Dated:

July

'

,1988.
,.V"', •••'1iTrLr Hji.,-,1'-.
Karen Hatch A d a m s ,
Plaintiff,
Howard H. Adams,
Defendant.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE.OF UTAH

KAREM HATCH ADAMS (LISONBEE) ,

ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.
HOWARD H. ADAMS,

Civil No. 24881

Defendant.

This
Defendant's

matter

having

Motion

on

coone on

the

29th

regularly

for

hearing

upon

day of June, 1989, before Maurice

Richards, Domestic Commissioner of the above entitled Court*
Plaintiff
represented
Office

of

by

was
his

Recovery

present

pro

se, Defendant

was

present

attorney, SCOTT W* HOLT, and the State of Utah,
Services

was

represented

by

KARL

G. PERRY,

Assistant Attorney General.
The
stipulation
parties1

Court,
filed

counsel's

after
on

having reviewed the file and the parties'

July

27, 1988, and

after listening to the

representations and argunents and for good cause

thereby appearing, does hereby
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE:
1.
of

July,

That the parties entered into a Stipulation on the 27th
1988 where in lieu of child support, Defendant would allow

Plaintiff

to

reside

at the premises located at 165 West 200 North,

Laytonr Utah, rent free.
2.
an

That

the

agreement was a reasonable agreement and not

attempt to defraud or evade child support, the rental value being

equal

or

greater

than

the child support Defendant was required to

Pay.
3.
Plaintiff

That

Plaintiff

furnished

to

the

went
State

on
of

welfare in March, 1989; that
Utah a copy of the parties1

agreement.
4.
although

That

the

State knew of the parties1 agreement, which,

not reduced to a written order, was sufficient to be deemed

as if an Order had been drafted by the Court.
5.
agreement
wages;

That

the

proceeded

that

State, after being informed of the parties'

to obtain a judgment and/or garnish Defendant's

Defendant

incurred necessarily attorney's fees in this

matter in defending the State's action and bringing this action.
6.

That

the

parties' agreement is approved and its terms

are hereby incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
7.

That

the State is permanently enjoined from attempting

to enforce any income withholding in this matter.
8.
$150.00

That

Defendant

is awarded

judgment

in

the

sum of

together with costs incurred in this action in the amount of

$6.90 as against the State of Utah, ^Office of Recovery Services.
DATED this /&

day of *a*y, 1989.

Reconnended by:

MAURICE" RICHARDS y

Domestic Commissioner
Recommendations

approved and accepted this

day of July,

1989.

DISTRICT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT:

KARL G. PERRY
Attorney for State of Utah
Office of Recovery Services
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I hereby certify that a trno a ^
1 " « u a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Order on Order to Show Caus* u» c
-^
<-u snow cause was mailed to KARL G. PERRY,
Attorney for State of ut-ah n**ot Utah, Office of Recovery Services, at 225
South 200 west, P.O. B O X 699, Farraington, utah
^
^ fe
Plaintiff, Karen Hatch ^ s (Lisaibee) afc ^
^
^
^
Layton, Utah 84041 hhi« / «. J
this J * * day of July, 1989 by depositing same
in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
KAREN HATCH ADAMS (LISOMBEE),
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
HOWARD H. ADAMS,
Defendant.

Civil No. 24881

This natter having cons on regularly
aay of Septe*er.

1989 fot f u r t h e r

Utah's

to

option

Coanissioner, Curiae

the

for

^ . ^ ^

recant

Richards, which

^

^

^

on

^

Order of * .

ratter

^

^

^

^
Do^stic

was heard without a

jury by the Honorable Douala<? r r~-„,^
e uougias L. Cornaby, one of the Judges of the
above entitled Court.
•»

State of Utah was represented by Richard A. Hun^l of

the Utah state Attorney's Office Pl»inHf<=
i
v m c e . Plaintiff was present pro se and
the Defendant was present, represented by Scott W. Holt.
*»

court, after reviewing

-tter, hearing

the t e s t i f y

witnesses and t e s t i f y

^

0f

*.

the file and record in this
the parties, their respective

representation

^

^

^

^

their respective counsel and for g o * cause thereby appearing, the
Court

does

hereby

^

the following

Findings

of

Fact

HI mm

«-

Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
parties1

That

original

the

Plaintiff and Defendant desired to amend the

decree of divorce to provide that Defendant would

not pay child support in lieu of charging rent to Plaintiff.
2.
Agreement

That
amending

the

parties1

the

Decree

entered
which

into

was

a

filed

Stipulation

and

with the Clerk's

office on the 27th of July, 1988.
3.

That

the

fair

market

rental value of the house that

Plaintiff occupied was worth at least $300.00-$350.00 per month.
4.

That

Defendant was under a duty of support at the rate

of $100.00 per month for each of the two children of the parties.
5.

That

stipulation
aware

of

which

there
was

was

no

order

accompanying

the parties1

filed with the Court, but the Court was made

what was happening between the parties; the Decree was not

however formally modified.
6.
welfare

and

That

in

furnished

March
a

or

copy

April,
of

the

1989 Plaintiff applied for
stipulation as part of her

application.
7.
State

That on May 5, 1989, this action was filed to estop the

of Utah from garnishing Defendant's wages or entering judgment

for child support.
8.

That

the

advance

notice

of

income

withholding was

received by the Defendant on or about April 19, 1989.
9.
prior

That

the Defendant had a conversation with Mr. Coombs,

to the Notice of Withholding being received by Defendant, that

Defendant would be receiving said notice.
10.
binding

That Defendant was informed that the Stipulation wasn't

and

that

the

State

intended

to go ahead and collect the

child support.
11.
that

it

return

Defendant

had

received

a Notice from the State

was going to withhold monies for child support from his tax

and

hearing

That

on

affect
this

his credit, which notice was sent after the last
matter

and

after

the

Court

had

indicated its

position with regards to the parties1 stipulation.
12.
Court
was

and
going

That

this

matter

is

now at a third time before this

all

through this process, the State has insisted that it

to

collect the child support from Defendant irregardless

of what the Court has indicated in this matter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That Defendant was compelled to bringing this action by

reason of the State's position in this case.
2.

That

Defendant

does not owe anybody one dime for back

support in this matter up to today's hearing date.
3.
matter

That

because

the

of

Court

the

asked

State's

the

attorneys

to settle this

objection to the previous award of

$150.00 attorney's fees and who would pay it.
4.
credit

That

received

that

the

point

of

it
as

and

like a simple matter to apply any rent

an offset on Plaintiff's grant; that it appears

Bureaucracy
view

seems

is

so

big and blinded that it only sees its

in this case, it hasn't been reasonable and has

been blind to fairness and reasonableness of the facts of this case.

5.
collect

That

child

the

support,

Defendant's

tax

action

brought

was

action

taken

threaten

return

was

upon

by

the

garnishment

State to threaten to
and

withholding

of

not based upon good faith and that the

bad faith

from the beginning to the end

with the State being fully aware of the parties1 agreement.
6.

That

difference

the

State and the parties have appeared on three

occassions and have objected to the judgment of the Court

and attorney's fees but never offered any relief.
7.
and

That

because

that

they

of

Office of Recovery Services has been unreasonable
their

bad

faith and unreasonableness it is proper

pay part of Defendant's attorney's fees in this matter in

the amount of $476.00 and costs incurred.
8.

That

the

previous

order

entered

by

the

Domestic

Commissioner is sustained.
DATED this ^ /

day of

K's*'*><•

~ y^JL989.
/

DISTRIGL^JUDGE
/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I
foregoing
Attorney

hereby

certify

Findings
for

that

a

true

and

correct

copy

of the

of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to the

the State of Utah, Richard A. Hummel, at 225 South 200

West,

P.O.

Box

699

Farmington,

Karen

Hatch

84041

this 5?*> day of

Utah

84025 and to the Plaintiff,

Adams (Lisombee), at 165 West 2000 North, Layton, Utah
{QihUw^J

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.

, 1989 by depositing same in the
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND K>R DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
KAREN HATCH ADAMS (LISOMBEE),
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND DECREE

Defendant.

Civil No. 24881

vs.
HOWARD H. ADAMS,

This matter having con* on regularly for hearing on the 14th
day of

Septe^er,

1989 for further hearing based upon the State of

Utah's

objection

to

c^issioner,

Maunce

the

reco™*^

order of the

Richards, which „ „ «

Domestic

was heard without a

jury by the Honorable Douglas L. Comaby, one of the Judges of the
above entitled Court.
rne State of Utah was represented by Richard A. Hurm^l of
the Utah

State Attorney's Offire Piaim-iff ~=
i
^i.i.j.(_t, iiaintiii was present pro se and
'he i«re,«iani was present, represented by Scott w. Holt.
"«

Court, after reviewing

matter, hearing
witnesses
their

and

the test l m o „ y
testimony and

respective

Conci usioi is of

counsel

and

0f

the file ,„, ,OT,rrJ „, , hls
the parties, their respective

the representation

and argu^nts of

base 1 in * ,n -h« P-~Qm,be l
' %K m he Findings ot Fact and

Law ^nr? ^~
a
Law, and for good

cause thereby appearing, it is

hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That

the previous order entered herein by the Domestic

Coomissioner, Maurice Richardsf is sustained.
2.
State
in

That

the

Defendant is awarded judgment as against the

of Utah, in the amount of $476.00 together with costs incurred

the amount of $5.00 for part of Defendant's attorney's fees which

he incurred.
DATED this ___

day of

/^w>/V^.

, 1989.

/

/

DISTRICT JUDGE'

/

~~ '

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

hereby

certify

foregoing

Judgment

State

Utah,

699

of

Farmington,

(Lisombee),
day

of

at

and

Decree

Richard
Utah

a
was

true

and

correct

copy

of the

mailed to the Attorney for the

A. Hunmel, at 225 South 200 West, P.O. Box
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R810-213-300 Heed and Amount of Assistance
R810-213-303 Income
The department shall enforce the standards described in 45 CFR 233.20,
233.53, 232.20, and 232.21 which are hereby adopted and incorporated by
reference. Amendments required by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 514) and
the Family Support Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-485) have been incorporated.
303.1 Current Departmental Practices
1. All bona fide loans are excluded. A bona fide loan is a loan which
has been contracted in good faith without fraud or deceit and genuinely
endorsed in writing for repayment.
2. Support and maintenance assistance is excluded.
3. The value of food stamp coupons is excluded.
4. The value of special circumstance items is excluded if thr" i i ems dte
paid for by donors.
5. The value of governmental rent and housing subsidies is excluded.
6. The income of dependent children is counted when determining
eligibility based on gross income and need, it is disregarded when
determining payments if the child is:
a. In school or training full-time.
b. In school and training part-time, if employed less than 100 hours.
c. In JTPA.
7
An amount up to $175 per month per child under age two and $160 per
month per child age two and older is allowed as an earned income deduction
for part-time employment.
8. Unearned income in-kind is excluded.
9. Home energy assistance is excluded.
10. Cash gifts for special occasions which do not exceed $30 per quarter
for each person in the assistance unit are excluded. The gift can be
divided equally among all members of the assistance unit.
11. $30 is deducted from rental income unless greater expenses can be
proven. Expenses in excess of $30 can be allowed for:
a. Taxes and attorney fees needed to make the income available,
b. Upkeep and repair costs necessary to maintain the current value of the
property. Only the interest can be deducted on a loan or mortgage made for
upkeep or repair.
c. If meals are provided to a boarder, the value of a one-person food
stamp allotment is deducted.
12. The IV-A state plan provides that assigned support payments retained
in violation of 45 CFR 232.12(b)(4) are subject to IV-D recovery.
13. An individual's income is allocated for his own support and others
living with him when the individual is not applying for or receiving
assistance. Those included for allocation are:
a. The following non-sanctioned individuals:
(1) the individual who is not in the assistance unit and whose income is
being counted, and
(2) the individual's non-recipient dependants or others:
(a) who are or could be claimed as dependents for determining federal
income tax, or
(b) whom the individual is legally obligated to support.
14. All applicants and recipients must apply for all benefits for which
they are entitled with the exception of Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
15. Shelter, utilities, and other similar needs are not prorated when the
AFDC assistance unit lives together with other individuals as a household.
16. All money received on a sales contract from an exempt property or an
insurance settlement for destroyed exempt property is counted unless the
income is used to purchase replacement property in accordance with 304.1
below.
17. When an m e -"
parent and the vni lrtrpn LH-« ,<«..-*..-- -*•

a. Unearned income is cash received for which the individual performs no
service.
b. A full-time student is a person enrolled for the number of hours
defined by the particular institution as fulfilling full-time requirements.
c. A part-time student is a person who is enrolled for at least one-half
the number of hours or periods considered by the institution to be customary
to complete the course of study within the minimum time period. If no
schedule is set by the school, the course of study must be no less than an
average of two class periods or two hours per day, whichever is less.
d. School attendance means a person is enrolled in a public or private
elementary or secondary school, a university or college, a vocational or
technical school or the Job Corps, for the express purpose of equipping
himself with skills that will lead to gainful employment.
e. Quarter means any one of the three month periods of January through
March, April through June, July through September, October through December.
f. Full-time employment is an average of 100 or more hours of work per
month or an average of 23 hours per week.
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